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THE CLASH OF LEGAL CULTURES: THE TREATMENT OF
INDIGENOUS LAW IN COLONIAL AND POST-COLONIAL
AFRICA
Justice Modibo Ocran*
The historic Berlin Conference on Africa in 1885 is often credited
with the official beginning of colonialism in Africa. However, this
Conference, held among the principal colonial European powers
(Germany, France, Britain, Belgium, and Portugal), essentially marked
the agreement among those powers to define territorial areas of influence
in Africa. Long before this Conference, individual European powers had
reached their own accommodation with indigenous peoples of Africa in
various corners of the continent.
Thus, in the southern part of Ghana, then called the Gold Coast, the
Bond of 1844 was signed by the British and the local chiefs in the
southern part of the country under which the locals accepted British
sovereignty or dominion over them in exchange for protection from their
warlike neighbors further to the north. Indeed, Europeans interacted with
the peoples of Africa for centuries before 1844. In the Gold Coast, for
example, as far back as 1475, the Portuguese had set foot at a coastal
place they called Elmina (Portuguese for “the mine”). However, the
Portuguese did not have much success with colonialism in West Africa.
In the Gold Coast, they were kicked out successively by the Dutch and
then the English, and the territory became a British colony.
The story of the legal relationship between European and African
legal systems that intrigues comparative lawyers starts in the 19th
Century. As part of the Colonial Administration, the British naturally
wanted to enforce law and order and to generally regulate the lives and
habits of the people that they conquered. This was not always easy for
the British, both as a practical matter and as a matter of legal doctrine
and ideology. They encountered a legal system quite different from their
*
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own legal traditions. They had to deal with a religion-based legal system
simultaneously meant for secular application that was unlike other forms
of religious law, such as Canon Law, which largely applied to the
spiritual realm of life. They also faced hostile reaction from strong
indigenous cultures which were not necessarily prepared to accept the
assumptions of the Western cultural mind. Ultimately, the culture
accepted the creation of legal pluralistic systems in which the English
dominated, but indigenous law also was maintained up to a certain
point.1
In other parts of Africa, it was not simply the clash between
European and indigenous African cultural norms, but between European
and Muslim or Islamic Law as well. A cultural influence of a different
sort had already taken root. People had converted to Islam in some parts
of Africa,2 and indeed in sections of the same community, while others
in the same society had embraced Christianity. This was the beginning
of the “triple heritage” of the African legal system: traditional, JudeoChristian, and Islamic legal culture.3
At the start of the legal history that we are concerned with, the
characteristics of African society were either pre-industrial or traditional.
Society was characterized by a subsistence level of living, using the
sociological classificatory scheme of societies based on their level of
socio-technical complexity.4 African economy at that point was heavily
agrarian.5 Societies tended to be organized in small groupings, and “[t]he
most important basis for [a] relationship was kinship.”6 Sociologists
refer to them as “kin-dominated” societies.7 However, there were other
factors that bound together individuals, such as their economics, politics
and religion. Thus, these societies are also referred to as “multiplex”
societies.8 Because of these socio-economic characteristics, there
inevitably was a close identification of traditional society with
customary law. Individuals’ roles typically were allocated “on the basis
of ascriptive criteria” or birthright-related characteristics, which

1. See ANTONY ALLOTT, NEW ESSAYS IN AFRICAN LAW (Allott ed., Butterworth & Co. Ltd.
1970) (referring to adoption of some customary laws while implementing statutory regulation).
2. David S. Clark, The Idea of the Civil Law Tradition, in COMPARATIVE AND PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW 12-16 (David S. Clark ed., 1960).
3. Id.
4. JOHN H. BARTON ET. AL., LAW IN RADICALLY DIFFERENT CULTURES 40 (West
Publishing Co., 1983).
5. Id. at 41.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 42.
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consequently depended on one’s “sex, kinship, nob[ility of] birth, age
and . . . birth order.”9 The people were soaked in traditionalism and
custom. Their mindset was: “[P]erform the ritual customs because your
ancestors did so,” and “stick with something that seems to work.”10
The starting point of custom is of course practice or long usage. In
traditional African societies, custom became the principal, if not the
only, source of law. Kings or chiefs occasionally issued edicts, but
custom was decidedly the main source of law. The chief himself was
bound by custom and indeed was the repository of custom. Thus, in
Western discussions of sources of law, the focus on this epoch in Africa
would not be on legislative or judicial formulations, but rather on
custom; viewed as usage of a long duration. Usage led to custom, and
part of custom eventually became customary law. Customary law comes
partially from the customs of the people, that is, that portion of customs
that the people have accepted as community-governing principles, the
violation of which would result in punishment. The rest of custom, that
is non-legal custom, would not normally lead to punishment when
violated, but could still effectively regulate norms of conduct. Custom
itself emerged not simply from what was practiced, but also from the
highly influential morals and religious beliefs of the people.
Traditional or customary law at that time was wholly unwritten for
the simple reason that it was not a literate culture. Even today, much of
customary law is unwritten, but there has been a growing corpus of
treatises and court decisions setting down customary rules of law as the
authors judge them to be.11 Therefore, it is now much easier to state the
rule of customary law on a particular issue.12
Indigenous or customary law in pre-colonial Africa is simply
defined as rules of custom, morality, and religion that the indigenous
people of a given locality view as enforceable either by the central
political system or authority, in the case of very serious forms of
misconduct, or by various social units such as the family. In terms of
Western literature on the nature of law, jurists in these African societies
were much closer to philosophies articulated by the German Karl von
Savigny, and others in the historical school of jurisprudence. The core
tenets of African customary law are its emphasis on collective
responsibility, respect for the elderly, collective rights, and respect for
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. RENE DAVID & JOHN E. C. BRIERLEY, MAJOR LEGAL SYSTEMS IN THE WORLD TODAY
566 (3d. ed. 1985).
12. Id.
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long-established institutions.
However, this indigenous body of law began to face an assault from
external influences in the form of Christian colonial power and Islamic
religion. Would the new colonial powers reject African Law outright as
somehow inconsistent with the primary imperative of colonialism to
dominate the colonized people? If customary law was not to be accepted,
could European law rule both European and non-European peoples in
the enlarged colonial community? In any case, what should be the actual
content of customary law in the new, multi-ethnic, African colonial
states, where there are vastly different cultures and languages within one
community? This was a problem, because if custom partially defines
customary law, and if custom itself is something that emanates from the
people, then there would be as many customary laws as there were
different communities. In the Gold Coast, for example, there were at
least ten major ethnic groups. In terms of custom and customary law,
whose customary law should the British apply? Further, assuming the
British knew what customary law consisted of, would they automatically
apply it? Now that the British were the unchallenged colonial masters,
intent on keeping their own proud tradition and culture, executing their
so-called dual mandate in Africa, protecting the possessions of the
Empire, and concurrently civilizing the peoples of Africa in the
European ways, what were the British to do with the cultural norms of
the conquered indigenous population?
By way of comparison, a similar problem also arose in Latin
America at the start of Spanish and Portuguese rule there. Woodrow
Borah, writing on the accommodation of Spanish and Indian law in
colonial Mexico, noted that during the mid-16th century, a series of
discussions among Spanish policy-makers had “attempted to settle [the
nature of] the relations[hip between the ruling Spanish group] and the
subjugated communities.”13 This discussion took center stage
particularly “from . . . 1511 on[wards when] some members of the
[Spanish] bureaucracy, disturbed by the destruction of the Indian
population in the Antilles and on the mainland, [sought to establish] less
murderous systems of exploiting the colonies.”14

13. WOODROW BORAH, JUSTICE BY INSURANCE: THE GENERAL INDIAN COURT OF COLONIAL
MEXICO AND THE LEGAL AIDS OF THE HALF-REAL 27 (University of California Press) (1983).
14. Id.
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Borah notes that in general there were three schools of thought on
this matter.15
One [school] . . . held that the Indians, having developed their own
[organized] society, were entitled to [keep] their own institutions and
laws. Should they come under the rule of a foreign sovereign [such as]
the Spanish King, he was bound to uphold and defend native
institutions and laws . . . since he [in effect] served as the native prince.
The most that might be conceded [in the name of] . . . change was the
minimum necessary for extirpating idolatry and introducing
Christianity.16

The second school of thought focused on the idea of one society,
which signified a determined assimilation of the Indians into Castilian
institutions.17 This view was held by most crown jurists involved in
“developing a unitary legal system which would replace feudal diversity
with a uniform royal administration [based in Spain].”18 The third school
“urged . . . the Indians and Spanish [to] be organized into two separate
commonwealths, each with its own laws, customs and systems of
government.”19 An extreme exposition of this view held “that the Indian
commonwealth be so completely separate that it would be linked with
the Spanish only by being subject to the same [metropolitan ruler].”20
The difference between the first and the third schools appeared to be that
in the first, the Spanish and Indians would be within the same political
and legal community, whereas the third school envisaged a kind of
federalism or separate states both working toward the potentate in Spain.
As Borah notes, the official Spanish response was ambivalent but
did suggest a rejection to a large extent of the “two republics idea” and
the approximation of the first school of thought.21 This response was
somewhat predictable. Indeed, this appeared to be one of the imperatives
inherent in the imposition of alien sovereignty and religion, as well as
the settlement of an alien upper class.
[I]t was unthinkable that the Spanish [would] permit the continued
practice of idolatry and human sacrifice, and the continued existence of
the heathen religious hierarchies. It was equally unthinkable that the
Castilian crown . . . officials [would leave intact] the old native
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
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political superstructures and their administrative hierarchies.22

Moreover, on the level of human relations, there eventually
developed a considerable intermingling between Spanish and Indians.
As “Spaniards took up residence in Indian towns . . . to establish
businesses and care for properties, large numbers of Indians were drawn
into Spanish households as permanent or semi-permanent workers.”23
In colonial Africa, the merger of the two cultures occurred as the
British accepted customary law to some extent, but also riddled it with
so-called repugnancy clauses, in order to avoid those aspects of African
customs that European culture found most appalling, ridiculous, or
simply unhelpful to the inculcation of Christian ideals.24 The British
colonial administrator and lawyer, R.S. Rattray, in his book entitled
Ashanti Law and Constitution 25 provides several good examples of the
kinds of crimes and civil offenses among the Ashantis of Ghana in the
19th Century that the British would have found extremely strange,
disgusting, amusing, or simply intolerable. Predictably, the colonial
masters would battle with many of them.
Several examples of criminal offenses can be provided. The
Ashantis, who inhabited the Gold Coast, referred to crimes as “Oman
Akyiwade,” literally meaning “[t]hings hateful to the Tribe.”26 In
Western jurisprudential language, they might be referred to as offenses
against the state (even though we should remember that the state in the
Western sense was not always present in 19th Century African
communities).
These [offenses] were looked upon as sins . . . which the central
authority was bound to take immediate official notice, lest [the]
supernational . . . [powers of the tribe] wreak their vengeance upon
[the chiefs and subchiefs] whose paramount duty it was to protect the
interest of the group.27

Two things particularly baffled the British. One was the crime of
suicide, and the other was witchcraft.
The Ashanti crime of suicide refers to successful suicide and not
attempted suicide, which is viewed as a crime in many non-African legal

22. Id. at 35.
23. Id. at 32.
24. See infra notes 61-66.
25. R. S. RATTRAY, ASHANTI LAW AND CONSTITUTION (Vivian Ridler ed., Oxford University
Press 1969) (1929).
26. Id. at 294.
27. Id.
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systems as well.28 It was a crime to commit suicide, with only a few
exceptions where suicide was excused.29 For example, it “was
considered as honourable and . . . praiseworthy to kill oneself in war by
taking poison or sitting on a keg of gunpowder to which a light was
supplied, rather than to fall into the hands of the enemy; or to return
home from war to a tell of defeat.”30 It was also excusable “to take one’s
own life in order to accompany a beloved master to the world of the
spirits.”31 Apart from these and other similar situations, suicide was
considered to be a serious crime for which the society provided serious
consequences.32 “[T]here was always a legal presumption that the
motive for self destruction had been evil.”33
But so what? In the “right to life” discourse, the bottom line is who
has the right, if it exists at all? In this traditional society the life and the
body of individuals were supposed to belong to the community, and the
central authority was the only party which had the right to take a life.
Therefore, the central authority viewed with disfavor any attempt to
interfere with “its prerogative as the sole dispenser of capital
punishment.”34 It was also said that “the tribal authority may have placed
suicide [among the capital offenses out of] a dislike [for] evil[-inclined]
disembodied spirits wandering about in its midst.”35
The spirit of the suicide became . . . a ghost wandering about in search
of an abode; for it was debarred from entering the land of spirits until
the expiration of its destined time upon earth, which it had itself
wrongfully curtailed.36

But since the person who committed the act of suicide was already
dead, one might ask what difference it would make even if what he had
done amounted to a crime. Surprisingly, the dead person would be
brought back from his grave, if he had already been buried, “to stand . . .
trial before the Council of Elders.”37 The “dead body was addressed by
the Okyeame,” spokesperson of the Chief.38 “As soon as the Okyeame
delivered his oration (basically condemning the dead man for
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2006

Id. at 299.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 299-300.
Id. at 300.

7

Akron Law Review, Vol. 39 [2006], Iss. 2, Art. 4
OCRAN1.DOC

472

4/14/2006 1:13:40 PM

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[39:465

committing suicide), the Chief’s executioners would step forward and
decapitate the dead body. Thus, suicide was a capital offense because it
involved the losing of one’s head.39 “The kinsmen of the suicide
[then] . . . had to produce every bit of his personal private property,
which was then confiscated by the Chief.”40
The second cause for consternation for the British was the crime of
witchcraft or “Bayie.” “Witchcraft all over Africa was [something]
regarded by the community with particular dread and abhorrence.”41 Of
course, Western folklore is replete with stories of witches and ghosts,
but to consider witchcraft as a criminal offense was a step apart.
“Witchcraft was essentially the employment of anti-social magic.”42 The
sorcerer, or the one who practiced witchcraft, would be put on trial,
either “by having [him] tracked down by a witch finder, or as [a] result
of an ordeal.”43 If found guilty, “the witch was either driven out with a
fire-brand in his or her hand, to die of starvation, or was smeared all over
with palm oil and cast into a fire, clubbed, strangled or drowned.”44
Apart from the question of proof, another problem the British
Colonial Jurists confronted in dealing with witchcraft was the legal
options open to the victim or to his relatives. Was it appropriate, or
legally excusable, to kill someone believed to be a witch? More
particularly, was it legally excusable to kill a witch in an anticipatory
strike, in the manner of self defense? For example, if Mr. X had a
spiritual experience or dream that someone planned to kill him by
witchcraft, and preempts the attack by killing the person, should such
homicide be excused as self defense? The suggestion that it was legally
excusable to kill to preempt or prevent witchcraft baffled European
jurists for years in Colonial African courts.
There was yet another criminal act among the Ashantis, this time of
a sexual nature, that seemed ridiculous to the European mind, but vividly
demonstrated the thought-process of a mind steeped in animism. In the
belief system of animism, the gods are supposed to lurk in the bushes,
rivers, mountains, trees, and in the elements in general. Basically, it
illustrates the impact of religious beliefs on law and on people’s attitudes
toward punishment. Rattray described this offense as “sexual intercourse
in the leaves,” and in the Twi language of the Ashantis was referred to as
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id.
Id. at 301.
Id. at 313.
Id.
Id. Ordeal was favored as a mode of trial for witches. Id.
Id. at 313.
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“ababantwe” or “ahahantwe.”45 A better English translation is having
sexual intercourse in the bush. It was not that the Ashanti culture was
unromantic, but no form of romance could come close to the defilement
or desecration of the Goddess Earth, which the Ashantis called “Asaase
Yaa.”46 Thus, an act which otherwise would not be a sin was regarded as
such because of the impudence displayed in the face of the great
supernatural powers.
There were several gradations of this offense, including some
regarded as criminal, and others regarded merely as disgusting forms of
civil misbehavior.47 It was considered a capital offense to have sexual
intercourse with a married woman in the bush through seduction or use
of force.48 It was not so much the rape aspect or the woman’s marital
status that attracted this type of punishment, but the fact that it was done
in the special preserve of Asaase Yaa (in the bush). At the very least,
this required a high degree of propitiation, but in some cases the
punishment was death. If the sexual act was committed with the
woman’s connivance or consent, the male culprit, besides paying
customary damages to the victim’s husband, and “was also fined a sheep
which was sacrificed upon the spot where the adulterous act had taken
place.”49 The following prayer in propitiation accompanied the ritual:
Thursday’s Earth Goddess (i.e. Asaase Yaa), a man has a room, he has
a mat, yet he seduced a woman here on the bare ground; because of
that we have brought you this sheep. Moreover, if any one does so
again, grant that the deed may be publicly known and “come out.”50

This incantation, couched in language of ridicule, was in itself an
effective sanction among the proud Ashanti. However, if the male culprit
committed the sexual act in the bush without consent, then the Ashanti
would inflict capital punishment, and “that almost invariably removed
the necessity for any further formalities in the nature of propitiation.”51
Outside the criminal law, there were other practices that baffled the
Victorian morality of the British colonials. The Masai ethnic group in
Kenya practiced self help in which it was the prerogative of a murdered
person’s family to go after the murderer, subject to the possibility of

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
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accepting so called “blood-money” as civil damages, in lieu of death.52
Additionally, there was the general practice of widow inheritance. There
was an “obligation [of the] widow to marry . . . a relative of the deceased
husband.”53 There was also differential law of adultery by which the
“husband could legally complain about his wife’s extra-marital affairs”
and claim damages, but a wife could not do the same.54
In some parts of Africa, there was “the absolute claim of the
husband to legal paternity” despite the natural parenthood of the child.55
Thus, in the famous Zimbabwe case of Vela v. Mandanika and Magutsa
(1936 S.R. 171) plaintiff, M’s husband under customary law,
successfully sued Defendant, the wife’s lover who had been living with
her, for the custody of M’s children, fathered by Defendant.56 The
Igberra tribe in Nigeria had the rule “that any child born within ten
calender months of a divorce could become the property of the former
husband,” in spite of the well-known rule that a child’s best interest is of
primary importance.57 There was a practice of domestic slavery, along
with other deprivation of personal freedom that had many of the
attributes of slavery.
In the area of succession or inheritance, the practice among the
matrilineal communities of Africa, such as my own, was that one’s
children had no right of inheritance. The property went to one’s maternal
nephews and nieces.58 This might have been very strange to the English,
who at one point practiced the rule of primogeniture. There was a clear
lack of sympathy for individually-owned landed property in many parts
of Africa, which led to the Ghanaian customary law that the individual’s
acquired property would become “family property” (property of the clan
or lineage) if the so-called owner utilized the help of other family
members in construction of a house or the cultivation of a farm.59
In the face of this clash of cultures and of legal thought, what were
the British to do in Africa? As with the Spanish and the Portuguese in
Latin America in the 16th Century, the matter had to be resolved one
way or another.60 At least in some parts of Africa, the indigenous
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

ALLOTT, supra note 1, at 164.
Id. at 166.
Id.
Id. (noting that they are questionable under repugnancy laws).
Id. at 167.
Id. at 172.
Id. at 173 (citing Danmole v. Dawodu, [1958] 3 F.S.C. 46 (Nigeria)).
Id. (citing Larbi v. Cato, [1959] G.L.R. 35, H. Ct.).
STUART B. SCHWARTZ, SOVEREIGNTY AND SOCIETY IN COLONIAL BRAZIL, THE HIGH
COURT OF BAHIA AND ITS JUDGES 1609-1751, at xiv-xv, 173-74, 185-86, 293-94, 304-05 (Lloyd
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communities had very ancient and proud cultures. Their animist
religious beliefs were strong and they were not about to give up their
way of life and their core beliefs, despite the overwhelming military and
political presence of the British. Were they to be physically
exterminated? Were they to be allowed to maintain themselves as a
people. If so, what should happen to their body of laws and customs?
The British eventually accepted customary law but put limitations on
their content and application.61 The British had to retain their status as an
imperial power as well as their public posture of introducing the
indigenous people to the civilized ways of Britain.
The legal strategy was to introduce “repugnancy clauses” into the
definition of customary law. These clauses defined the portions of
African customs that were to be viewed and applied as law within the
colonial legal system.62 Not all customs would be tolerated as having the
force of law under the British dispensation.63 Further, the content of
customary law was subject to a time limitation.64 Customs did not have
to exist from time immemorial, but such customs should at least have
come into existence by the establishment of the colonial legislature in
that particular territory (e.g. 1876 in the case of the Gold Coast).65
Finally, any customary rule that was inconsistent with colonial
legislation would be declared invalid.66
The repugnancy clauses were meant to rule out laws and customs
perceived to be against Christian values and morality or cruel and
unusual by the standards of the colonizers.67 There were various
formulations of these clauses. Some stated that the rules should not be
“repugnant to natural justice, equity and good conscience.”68 Others
read: “Not contrary to [religious] justice, morality or order.”69 Still
others read: “Not repugnant to morality, humanity or natural justice or
injurious to the welfare of the natives.”70 The repugnancy clauses were
typically contained in a statutory definition of customary or native law.71
Linford ed., University of California Press 1973). See also BORAH, supra note 13.
61. ALLOTT, supra note 1, at 158.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 150.
65. Id. at 151.
66. See id. at 175-77.
67. Id. at 162.
68. Id. at 158 (quoting Sierra Leone Local Courts Act 1965, § 76).
69. Id. (quoting Sudan Native Courts Ordinance 5.9(I)(a)).
70. Id. (quoting the African Courts Proclamation of Bechuanaland § I(2)).
71. Id. at 146 (noting that a typical formulation existed in the 1942 Native Court Proclamation
of Botswana, at that time called Bechuanaland. That proclamation read as follows:
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Natural justice is supposed to encompass such propositions as
follows:
No man should be a judge in his own cause . . .; [n]o man is to be
condemned unheard . . .; [a] man is entitled to know the particulars of
the charge or claim against him . . .; [d]ecisions should be supported by
reasons . . .; and [p]unishments and rewards should not be excessive,
but should be proportionate to the circumstances of the offense.72

As used in this legislation, the term “equity” did not refer to
technical equity or to the body of rules formerly administered in the
English Court of Chancery, but to equity in the sense of fairness.73 “This
would permit a judge to waive technicalities of either English or African
law and to disregard contemporary rules of law which would produce
manifestly unfair results.”74
“‘Morality’ or ‘good conscience’ is the least precise component of
the repugnancy clauses.”75 It refers to morality in the general sense and
thus lead to the inadmissibility of slavery, many forms of marriage
without both parties’ consent, and many other invasions of freedom.76
However, it was not morality in any particularly English sense because
much of what the “English might have been tempted to call immoral was
not always declared repugnant by the colonial system of justice.”77 It is
also quite clear that the standards of morality in different communities
are by no means the same. In fact, one British judge in a 1938 Tanzanian
case stated frankly:
I have no doubt whatever that the only standard of justice and morality
which a British court in Africa can apply is its own British standard.
Otherwise we should find ourselves in certain circumstances having to
condone such things, for example, as the institution of slavery.78

The results of such determinations were not always predictable. For
example, neither the form of marriage consideration, known in some
“Native law or custom” and “Native custom” mean in relation to a particular tribe or in
relation to any native community outside any tribal area the general law or custom of
such tribe or community except so far as the same may be incompatible with the due
exercise of His Majesty’s power and jurisdiction, or repugnant to morality, humanity or
natural justice, or injurious to the welfare of the natives.
72. Id. at 159-60.
73. Id. at 160.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 162.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 163 (citing Gwao bin Kilimo v. Kisunda bin Ifuti (1938), 1 T.L.R. (R.) 403).
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parts of Africa as Lobola, nor polygamy was declared as repugnant.79 In
fact, in South Africa, the African Native Administration Act of 1937
expressly provided that it would be unlawful for any court to declare the
customs of Lobola and polygamy as repugnant.80 Yet in the case
involving “exchange marriages” among the Tiv in Nigeria (that is, the
practice whereby “the consideration for the bride is the receipt of a bride
in exchange from [the groom’s] family”), such a practice was proscribed
by an administrative fiat in 1927.81
In Edet v. Essien, a child custody case from Nigeria, Plaintiff paid
dowry for the woman while she was still a child and later that woman
married another man, Defendant, who paid a second dowry to the
parents.82 The children whose custody was at stake were issues between
the woman and Defendant (the second man).83 The lower court held for
Plaintiff and ordered the return of the children to him.84 However, an
appellate court rejected Plaintiff’s case and said that even if the local
customary law supported that result, it would not be applied as it was
repugnant and opposed to natural justice.85
Soon after Africa attained political independence, from the late
1950s onward, the African intellectual elite decided to modify the
colonial repugnancy clauses. They felt insulted by the notion that their
own African laws were somehow repugnant. “Repugnant to what or to
whom?,” they asked. They wished to emphasize the fact that these laws
represented their own ethos. Similarly the term “native law” fell into
disfavor because of its colonial connotation as uncivilized. Thus, a new
type of legislation emerged in countries like Ghana, Sierra Leone, and
Botswana. Incompatibility with legislative enactments or of decisions of
the highest court of the land became the main criteria for distinguishing
between unacceptable and permissible customary rules within the legal
system. Thus, as early as 1958, one year after Ghana attained
independence from Britain, the Local Courts Act of Ghana defined
customary law as “any uncodified rules having the force of law and not
repugnant to the laws of Ghana . . . [including] any declaration of
customary law published from time to time in the Gazette.”86
In 1960, the Interpretation Act of Ghana, completely eliminated the
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
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Id. n.12 (citing The South African Native Administration Act 1927 § II (I)).
Id. at 165-66 n.13.
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word “repugnant.”87 After defining customary law as rules of law
applicable to particular communities in Ghana, the Act went on to state
that, “[a] reference in an enactment to a customary law shall be
construed as a reference to it as affected by any enactment for the time
being in force.”88 Tanzania’s Interpretation and General Clauses
Ordinance, as amended in 1963, was even more forthright. There was no
reference to repugnancy, natural justice, equity, or good conscience. It
simply stated that customary law “does not include any rule or practice
which is abolished, prohibited, punishable, declared unlawful or
expressly or impliedly disapplied [sic] or superseded by written
law. . . .”89
It should be noted that under the Ghana Interpretation Act,
customary law gained enough status that a portion of it could now be
assimilated into the newly defined common law of Ghana as suitable for
general application throughout the country.90 Within this new definition,
assimilated rules of customary law took precedence over the English
rules of equity and the English common law.91 On the other hand,
unassimilated customary law remained the customary law proper.92 Such
customary law took precedence over the redefined common law if the
parties to a suit or transaction came from the same tribal group and had
the same personal law.93 It was only when the parties did not have the
same personal law, and neither could show why the issue at stake should
be governed by his or her personal law, that the common law became the
applicable law.94
Yet one could deduce from the language of these post-colonial
statutes and constitutions that customary law is still subordinate to other
sources of law in the African legal systems. A hierarchy of norms had
been created, and customary law was not on top of the list. Rules of
customary law would be struck down if they conflicted with a superior
court decision. Article 11(1) of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana clearly
defines this hierarchy.95 It enumerates the sources of law in Ghana, in

87. The Interpretation Act 1960, (C.A.4) § I8(1).
88. ALLOTT, supra note 1, at 176 n.11.
89. Id. at 180 (citing the Interpretation and General Clause Ordinance (cap I, as inserted by
the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1963, Sixth Sched.) § 2 (I)).
90. The Interpretation Act 1960, (C.A.4) § I8(I)(I). See also, 1992 GHANA CONST. Ch. 4., art.
11.
91. BENTSI-ENCHILL, GHANA LAND LAW 85-86 (Sweet & Maxwell, Ltd.) (1964).
92. Id. at 86.
93. Id. (referencing Rule 2).
94. Id. (referencing Rule 3).
95. 1992 GHANA CONST., Ch. 4, art. 11.
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part, as follows:
(1) The laws of Ghana shall comprise(a) this Constitution;
(b) enactments made by or under the authority of the Parliament
established by this Constitution;
(c) any Orders, Rules and Regulations made by any person or authority
under a power conferred bythis Constitution.
(d) the existing law; and
(e) the common law.
(2) The common law of Ghana shall comprise the rules of law
generally known as the common law, the rules generally known as the
doctrines of equity and the rules of customary law including those
determined by the Superior Court of Judicature.
(3) For the purposes of this article, “customary law” means the rules of
law, which by custom are applicable to particular communities in
Ghana. 96

The 1992 Constitution (the current Ghanaian Constitution), has
thereby retained the 1960 approach of permitting part of customary law
to become part of the common law.97
There is, however, an unfortunate drafting problem in Article 11
(3), which defines customary law, “for the purpose of this article” (i.e.
for the whole of Article 11), as rules of law which, by custom, are
applicable to particular communities in Ghana.”98 If part of customary
law can become part of the common law, which are rules of general
application in Ghana, then the entire body of customary law should not
simultaneously be defined as rules applicable to particular communities
in Ghana. The distinction elegantly drawn in the 1960 Act between
assimilated customary law of general application and the remaining
corpus of customary law applicable only to particular communities, was
not fully captured in the present constitutional definition.
The Judiciary in Africa still has some juridical problems in
96. Id. (eliminating sections 4-7).
97. See ALLOTT, supra note 1.
98. 1992 GHANA CONST., Ch. 4, art. 11 (3).

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2006

15

Akron Law Review, Vol. 39 [2006], Iss. 2, Art. 4
OCRAN1.DOC

480

4/14/2006 1:13:40 PM

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[39:465

applying customary law as a source of law. First, at least a portion of
customary law is still the law of particular ethnic or tribal groups or
communities in Africa and not necessarily the general law. Second,
certain aspects of those rules are outmoded and inconsistent with modern
ideas of morality, even as viewed by Africans. Third, some customary
norms may be inimical to development. Thus, rather than being
ultranationalist in our attitude as jurists, the task is to modify customary
law in aid of modernization. The judiciary and legislature need to adapt
African indigenous law to make it a tool of socio-economic development
without sacrificing the core values of African society: the values of
fellowship, of being each other’s keeper, and the notion that the free
development of each is indeed a condition for the free development of
all.
The modern African judge will be the first to acknowledge that, in
many senses, the problems faced by the British judges in colonial Africa
have not vanished.99 Almost one hundred percent of the African
judiciary is now African.100 But even though there is no longer the gross
disparity of national origin between a judge and his community, a judge
often does not come from the particular locality whose ethnic law he is
administering.101 Apart from this ethnic question, there is an enormous
educational and cultural gap between a senior judge with a Western
education and the ordinary families he may deal with. Thus, the judicial
system may have moved from a problem of race and ethnicity to one of
class.
The promise of legal pluralism is still dear to us, but the
fundamental difficulties in its administration are real. Jerome Frank, one
of the theorists of American Legal Realist school, in his 1949 book
entitled Courts on Trial, discusses what he calls “the myth about the
non-human-ness of judges.”102 In a chapter entitled “Are Judges
Human,” Frank notes that “legal rules express social policies . . . and a
judge’s conception of such policies respond more or less to his social,
economic and political outlook, which usually derives from his
education, his social affiliation and his social environment.”103
In our own time, the Critical Legal Studies scholars have restated
this point of view in more radical terms, much to the annoyance of other
99. ALLOTT, supra note 1, at 255.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN JUSTICE 147
(Jerome Frank ed., Princeton University Press 1973) (1949).
103. Id. at 148.
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contemporary legal theorists. But the gravamen of their complaint, and
their determination to blow away the myth of the universally objective
judge, is very real. It is real even with African Judges when they are
called upon to apply or reject certain norms of African customary law.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2006

17

